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The problem is to recognize which
interest groups are exerting preponderant influence and for what
purposes ••• our theme, therefore, is
the need to subject the gothic
mysteries of science and technology
to ordinary political analysis,
commonsense political judgment,
and plain English.
--H. s. Nieburg, In The Name of Science

Chapter I
Introduction a
The Political Science of Science
I.

Flan of Work.

Role of the Introduction.

The bulk of this paper is devoted to a lengthy
explication, analysis, and harshly negative critique of the
course of the notorious debate, not yet closed, on the role
of falsification in the growth of scientific knowledge.
While it is primarily addressed to those conversant with
recent research in the area, the paper is written with a
view toward intelligibility and lucidity. and is as self
contained as possible.

It could therefore plausibly be

read as a separate document.
My aim in this introduction is to construct the
framework -- and to do no more than that -- for the analysis of the historical success of .the scientific enterprisG
from the vantage point of political theory.

That is, I
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propose to describe briefly, and by describing, expose, the
unholy alliance struck between the dominant (and, incidentally, Liberal 1 ) theory of the nature of science and the
received (Liberal) view of the nature of the proper relation between science and government.

I wish to suggest that these theories exist in a
symbiotic relationship, that the epistemology is cognate
with the politics, and vice versa, and that the falsification of the first compells the abandonment of the second.
It would be giving away my conclusion, were I to remark
that of course the main part of the paper is intended as

an effort in this direction.

II.

Th~ Latent Politics of
Science.

Contempor~ry

Philosophy of

The standard theory of science, in the diverse forms
conferred upon it by Popper and by

~.

is systematically

described in the paper, and its ideological functions are
dealt with there.

I don't want to antic.i:pate that section,

and so will confine myself here to a few global remarks.
Generally one can say that the two forms of the
theory, however sensationally they may differ in other contexts, share the autonomy thesis, a view according to which
the only legitimate criterion for the ·eTaluation of a scientific conclusion is an internal one, that is, one emerging
from the scientific process itself,

This thesis has been

formulated by Popper as follows1
••• there are pure scientific values and disvalues (Unwerte) and extta-sc.ientific values
and disvalues. And although it is impossible
to wholly preserve scientific research from
extra-scientific values and applications,
still it is the task of scientific criticism
and discussion to oppose the mixing of the
two spheres, and especially to rigorously
exclude extra-scientific values from influencing the discussion of th~ truth of an
assertion (Wahrheitsfragen)
.
and is presupposed in an extreme form in Kuhn's confident
gloss that
My argument ••• goes even further, for it
emphasizes that, unlike most disciplines,
the responsibility for applying shared
scientific values, must be left to the
specialists group. It may not even be
extended to all scientists, much less to
all educated laymen, much less the mob.J
(Taking this statement of Kuhn's at its face value, philosophy of science, conceived as a specialists' scientific
group, must be immune to any political criticism not accep.
ted by the group itself. Assuming normal professional
narrow-mindedness and disciplinary xenophobia, none will be
made, and in due course the absence of any criticism will
be cited as additional support for the now evident truth of
the autonomy thesis.)
In both cases the autonomy postulate is targeted to
deny the theoretical (as opposed to the merely accidental,
or "historical") significance for science of extrascientific "ideologies" (such as Marxism, Pragmatism, or
for that matter, natural theology), economic change, or the

4

influence of politics generally.

Moreover, in neither ver-

sion is the theory at all interested in the unique individual
actually doing science, although Kuhn exhibits an interest
in groups.

In this way both Popper and Kuhn can preserve

the traditional, Liberal, insistence on the unitary character of science as a method{ology), and maintain a strict
separation of scientific fact from practical {in the sense
of the German '"praktisch"), although obviously, in Kuhn's
case, not from professional, values.
There are, however, real differences between Popper
and Kuhn, which it would be exceedingly unwise to neglect.
Popper, as will be seen shortly, employs a ·very old image
of science, which is rather grossly incognate with the
present

i..~dustrial

reality.

Kuhn, who ha: taken the phe-

nomenon of "puzzles" -- small problems the form of whose
solutions are specified in advance -- Iar :more seriously
than anyone else, stands poised on the brink of the abyss
which separates Liberal epistemology from a vastly more
radical {and in present context, subversive) account of the
nature of knowledge.

Indeed his {alleged) subsequent re-

trenching from the position he outlined in the first, 1962
edition of his Structure of Scientific Bevrolutions may be
viewed as the consequence of his realization of just where
his theories were taking him. 4
But what of Liberal political theory?

What is the

liberal view of the relation between sc:Jence and government?

r

s

It is this topic to which I propose to devote the rest of
this introduction, in the conviction that the political
prescriptions of liberalism can best be elucidated in the
light of their unarticulated epistemological presuppositions, and that the discussion of epistemology -- of
philosophy of science, on the Liberal account -- can be
advanced by a consideration of the topic's hidden political
dimension.

III.

The Latent Philosophy of Science of Contemporary
Politics.
Price5 and Galbraith6 start from the present posi-

tion of science

taken to include both the natural and

social sciences

in American life.

Their joint concern

is to develop an account "not only of the practical relation
of scientific institutions to the economy and the government,"
but also of the theoretical relation of science to political
values ..... 7, they are, in other words, political theorists
concerned with the relationship of science to the government.
Now there are some minor differences of emphasis and
vocabulary between Price and Galbraith.

Price concerns him-

self exclusively with the "scientific estate," while Galbraith elongates his unit to include other components of
the knowledge industry, in particular, :members of university faculties not belonging in thp sciences.

Moreover,

Price's work on close examination discloses evidence of its

6

belated emergence from the anti-Communist chrysalis from
which so much recent American political "thought" has
emerged, and he exhibits throughout a far more naive and
simple-minded perception of politics in an advanced industrial society than does Galbraith.

However, Galbraith him-

self has conceded that
I have appropriated and somewhat altered the
usage of my friend Professor Don K. Price ••• 8
and r·am much indebted to his valuable book •••
and the similarities in assumptions, conclusions, and argument are so strong that I think one is justified in treating
them as representatives of a single viewpoint, which is
.Liberal.
Their argument may be paraphrased as followsa
Power in advanced industrial society depends
on control of the means of production, and
science is increasingly the most significant
component of the production process.

Conse-

quently, it is to the producers of scientific
knowledge that political power now accrues.
This means that the mantle of the classical,
profit-maximizing capitalist has now fallen on
the shoulders of the members of the educational
and scientific estate, who are ensconced chiefly
in universities and research institutes.

These

latter, being devoted to science, do not share.
the ruthlessness and prejudices of the antagon-'·

7

ists with whom they must still contend for
political power, the personnel of the 500
largest corporations.

This educational and

ecientific estate, fired with the

~

of

truth, and its free pursuit, have it within
their compass to buffer the acid results of politics, insuring
the hegemony of truth, good taste, and welfare
capitalism.
Even a cursory examination will show that the view
of science implied in this account includes the autonomy
thesis as an essential element.

This is not surprising, for

earlier the autonomy principle had been extensively identified with Liberalism.

Consider, in cameo, the following.

First, as Price incautiously lets slip,9 the argument presupposes a {simple-minded!) dichotomy of truth vs.
power.

Government is conceived as a realln of action and

will, which may or may not bear any access to truth, either
of morality or of science.

The scientilic realm, on the

other hand, is imagined to be sealed off by a Chinese Wall
of integrity from contamination by politics.

Where poli-

tics is admitted to have stolen its way into the scientific
sector, its intrusion is always viewed as pathological.
this account Lysenko is the perverse

epon~

On

for a whole

universe of malificent possibilities.
So it comes to be imagine4 that research priorities,
problem selection, problem solving strategies, and most of

8

all the transactions at conferences or in journals of the
"invisible college" of active research workers somehow
escape'the effects of the societal medium in which they are
enveloped -- a medium characterized above all by scarcity,
compulsive competition, and the omnipresence of politics.
Secondly, the character of scientific fact is unreflectively held to be uniquely free of public value •

.

Price, for instance, remarks that
•••• scientific precision is purchased by an
abstraction, and an exclusion of concern for
purpose and value, that make it impossible to
deal simultaneously with all the aspects of
any concrete problem.10
·
and Galbraith often criticizes the received opinion of his
discipline, not for embracing its nominal. canons of neutrality, but for its failure to live up

·t~

them.

Speaking

of the mass refusal by academic economists to acknowledge
the existence of industrial concentration and consequent
market power, he remarks that
In denying scientific recognition or even
legitimacy to this trend, economic theory
was not being politically and socially
neutral ••••• It was playing an .active -- an
actively fonservative -- role in the political
process. 1
And elsewhere he comments that
Economics has not been a science but a
conservatively useful belief de.fending
that belief as a science.12
The manifest assumption here is that a scientific theory of
the proper credentials would not share these failings, but
actually be neutral.

9

Finally, and related to the foregoing, neither
Price nor Galbraith finds very much problematic about the
entire scientific enterprise, however much individual speculations are excoriated.

For them, the status of natural

(and authentic social) science, in weal or woe, is invariably quo.

The suggestion that one might want to examine

scientific conclusions from the standpoint of one or another
metaphysic, or suggest that historical counter-examples be
enlisted to scrutinize the most fashionable contemporary
theories instead of the other way around (eg., witches or
religious mystics cited as evidence against some version of
a reductionist psychology, rather than the employment of
the psychology to eliminate the historicity of witches) -all of this to Price and Galbraith, wculd appear preposterous.

A fortiori, the suggestion that a social science

research program should constitute itself around a political
position.
Such are the implications of their position, a
view which over the centuries has acquired a quality of
obviousness not much inferior to the rotundity of the earth.
But however persuasive it may appear on the first complacent glance, it cannot be stressed too often or too strongly
that the entire argument hangs suspended by a single, slender
thread -- one of a highly theoretical character.

For it is

the autonomy thesis alone that ties together the politics
and the philosophy of modern science.

10

IV.

Consequence of Malfeasance.
Although Price and Galbraith are read mainly by

social scientists, an audience which overlaps but slightly
with that of Popper and Kuhn, their accord with the explicit conclusions of coniemporary philosophy of science has
·~_:$

not been without malignity.

The amiable, albeit uncon-

scious agreement contributes to the specious aura of inevitability which the autonomy thesis currently possesses.
Had either school developed a different viewpoint, some
word of the disagreement would inevitably have leaked back
to the other, perhaps providing a stimulus for review and
self-criticism.

Examples of such cross-fertilization are

rare, but they have happened.

Perhaps then the political

significance of science in the modern wor1d would not have
been so long occluded, we would have been spared the mendacity and self-deception of twenty years of Research and
Development rhetoric about the "challenge to national greatness," "because it is there," or the "pUJ.1 of the unknown,"
etc., and we would sooner have come to suspect that, as is
argued in the remainder of this paper, in capitalist society,
truth is power's last and most insidious DJaSk •

•

Chapter Ila
Industrialization and Falsification
I.

The Argument Summarized.

Preliminary Remarks.

The most striking characteristic of academic thought
is its innocence.

What follows is an argument that this

innocence grossly distorts current discussions of the role
of falsification in the growth of scientific knowledge•
Specifically, that the real causes of the irresolution and
aimlessness of the dispute are the diverse images of the
societal functions of science, comprising both descriptive
and prescriptive components, held firmly, although not fully
consciously, by Popper, 1 3 Kuhn, 14 and Feyerabend. These
images are of varying agesa each was once functional, but
only Feyerabend's comports the present situation in the
political economy of knowledge.

This fact is obscured by

the disputant·s' habit of pulling their examples indiscriminately from Thales down to Niels Bohr and beyond.
~ver,

More-

once the ideological cataracts are removed, one can

observe right under the unwitting noses of philosophers of
science the first, faint signs of the withering away of
natural science, a phenomenon to which Feyerabend's work
contributes.
Throughout the paper I elide the distinction between
science and technology.

This is less £roDll indolence than

from philosophic conviction, which can here only be stated
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and not justified.

In my opinion, a distinction between the

two might have made sense in only one historical epoch, viz.,
the one that just ended. 1 5 That no statesman's rodomontade
is bereft of a reference, however fleeting, to the sanguinary

state of the nation's "science and technology" is the

tribute moribund usage pays to relentless reality.

More-

over, as is currently fashionable, I treat science as con-

.

terminous with knowledge.

This is manifestly inadequate,

and would be a good subject for a paper -- another one.

II.

Contemporary Science Integrated Into the National
Political Economy. A Sketch for Background.
Once the sciences played only an indirect role in

the maintenance and expansion of the political economy of
capitalism.

The New Science of Physics was the natural

scion of a New Science of Politics, and the old modes of the
legitimation of political authority first shuddered, then
crashed into ruins.

The way was open for the bourgeois
revolutions of the 17th, 18th, and 19th ce.nturies. 16 But
in the New Industrial State, 1 7 (or, less e1egantly, the
hegemony of Monopoly Capita118 ), science has another,
·grander role.
This is its elevation to what Eisner recognizes as
the "critical factor of production, 111 9 on a par with the
hoary triad of land, labor, and capital.

~his

industrial-

ization of science transforms both scieace20 and industrialism21 out of recognition.

The mutations of industrial-

1J

ism have never lacked for interested commentators, but what
are the consequences for science?

This is Ravetz's ques-

tion, and his answer, even when discounted for its preliminary formulation, is devastating.
First, the extravagantly honored image of science as
the disinterested search for truth goes the way of the
economists' perfect competition under monopoly capital.

.

This

image will not vanish into thin air

it is much too useful

to some interested parties for that

but only philosophers

of science will be fooled.

Science is now a commoditya and

is another -- merely another -- aspect of commerce.

Like

any other commodity, it is a victim of the craving for
money, for profits, and for powers the object of pork-barrel
politics, and skullduggery, that charac"terize "political
capitalism. 022
No Karl Marx is needed to predict that such portentious changes in the forces of production will recrder the
relations of production.

And the loss of scientific inde-

pendence is a second aspect of the new political economy of
knowledge a
••• This change is as radical as tlnat which
occurred in the productive economy when independent artisan producers were displaced by
capital-intensive factory production employing
hired labor ••• With his loss of independence,
the scientist falls into one of three rolesa
either an employee, working under the control
of a superior; or an individual Olltworker for
investing agencies, existing on a succession
of small grantsa or he may be a can.tractor,
managing a unit or an establishmemt which
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produces research on a large scale by contract
with agencies.23
Thirdly, science becomes bureaucratized.
effects on the personnel.

This has

Organization men people the

organization, and Minerva's owl flies from 9 - 5.

Far more

malign, however, is the shift in the seat of quality control, for notwithstanding an occasional scandal, the National

.

Science Foundation does not yet give money awaya
The dispersal of large sums of money, and even
more the decisions between competing demands,
are matters which require proper procedures of
information and control. A completely informal
consensus of a large community is not sufficiently precise or reliable to be the basis
for such work; and the investing ,agencies must
work from the evaluations and judgements of a
group of advisors. With this eoacentration
of powers of decision and contro.J.. the free
market place of scientific resu.l"t&,, whose
value is established after they are offered
and by an informal consensus, is replaced by
an oligopoly of investing agencies,, whose
prior decisions determi~e what will eventually
come on to the market.2~
New forms of property spring up.

Once "scientific

property" was a paper in a recognized journal.

Now a good

personal contact to the source of the magic spigot will do,
or alternatively, a high score of publication points will be
equally salutary.
With the clamor for publication
comes redefined and vulgarized.

~he

literature be-

Journals proliferate, to

the general satisfaction of the prestigious editor, satis-

•

fied author, and affluent publisher.

~hen

the informal
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channels dilates
Through mailing-list distributions, scientists
will circulate not only reprints, but also
preprints, duplicated preliminary research
reports, conference abstracts, and informal
'newsletters' of people, events, and results.
These other types of publication are not
merely supplements to the off icia1 channel
of communication, making results available
more quickly than can the printed journals.
Rather, they are complementary to that
channels and their function is to provide
publication of a sort which is not subject
to the hazards, as well as the delays, of
the scrutiny of referees. For the same sort
of function is performed by raw collections
of conference papers, published in hard
covers and sold on the market~ but appropriately called 'non-books'.2~
It would be a grotesque blunder to catecarize all this commotion under "knowledge dissemination" _. some such rubric.
~his

is to miss its point, which is not t.o be read, but to

have been written.

Ravetz calls the pbanomenon "shoddy

science."
The path is clear to more refined., and lucrative,
forms of corruption.

One is "entrepreneurial science"a

It is in this borderland ••• that we find
some significant pathological phenomena. The
first occurs when a contractor (individual or
institutional) develops a really big enterprise, which is most likely to be on some
mission-oriented research in a·:f'iel.d where
money is plentiful and not too many questions
are asked. There then develops a research
business, making its profit by tile production
of results in the fulfillment of contracts.
The director of such an establishment is
then truly an entrepreneur, who juggles with
a portfolio of contracts, prospective,
existing, extendable, renewabie or convertible, from various offices in one or
several agencies. The business is precarious,
of course, for his only capital is in his
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friendly contacts with those who decide on
the allocation of funds. In such a research
factory, conditions are not usually conducive to the slow, painstaking, and selfcritical work which is necessary for the
production of really good scientific results.
Hence, much, most, or even all the work can be
shoddy1 but the entrepreneur does not operate
in the traditional market of independent
artisan producers who evaluate work by consensus. So long as he can keep his contacts
happy, or at least believing that they
personally have more to lose by exposing
themselves through the cancellation or nonrenewal of contracts than by allowing the~
to continue, his business will flourish.2
Still another is christened by Ravetz "reckless
science"a
••• a particular innovation may be recognized as
risky from the technical point of view, dubious
from the commercial point of view, of very
slight use to anyone at all, even the State,
and a potentially serious nuisance to the
public and source of legal and political difficulties, and yet still receive enormous sums
from the State ••• In calculating cost and
benefit it ignores all those costs of a
projec~ for which it cannot legally be called
to accounta in particular, the degradation
of the natural and human environment. Since
the combined effect of the present and future
technological developments is likely to be
catastrophic, this rush onwards can truly be
considered out of contro1.27
And of course there is the terrifying realm of
"dirty science", of nuclear bombs, gassed sheep, "unthinkable" thoughts, super-efficient napalm compounds, and
ICBM's.

This last type comprises "research projects whose

intended application lies beyond the pal.e of civilized
practice and morality."28
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Such is the reality of industrialized science.
While it may partake of the humorlessness, and share the
suffocating Weltanschauung characteristic of the central
Post-Newtonian tradition in philosophy of science, 2 9 in its
totality it presents a unique problem of comprehension.
Throughout, it is conditioned by one massively novel relations

III.

absorption into the circumambient political economy.

These Facts Not Yet Assimilated by Philosophy of
Science.
Contemporary philosophy of science plays with these

facts like a cat with a ball of yarn -- does everything except digest them.

This I propose to dmaonstrate by pre-

senting stylized sketches -- all that is necessary -- of the
views on falsification in science held by Popper, Kuhn, and
Feyerabend.

These sketches are crafted with a view toward

highlighting .the problematic that I am interested in, and
of course a much more extensive treatment would be necessary
for a discussion with pretensions to exhaustiveness.

This

qualification holds throughout, and I wil.l not repeat it in
the paper.

Now to the oldest image of science still in

'circulation, dating from a period of relatively undeveloped
productive forces and a primitive division of labor, when
philosophy and natural science were done by the same persons, that of Popper.
For this paper there is exactly one point that is
absolutely crucial to understanding his philosophy of science.
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It is that
••• all criticism consists in attempted refutations.JO
For Popper, science -- whether physical or social -- starts
with problems.

Not data, sensations,

species of observation.

1

hard' facts, or any

Theories are advanced, in the form

of deductive systems, as possible solutions to these problems.

They are then tested by attempts to find a refuting

instances

all planets in the solar system are conjectured

to possess.orbits tilting no more than seven degrees from
the plane of the earth's orbits we look, not for the eight
which do, but for the one that doesn't.

Although we are

naturally pleased should our theory be corroborated, Nature
is not asked by the scientist to say "yes", only "no".
Theories with a refuting instance are junked.

If the theory

resists falsification, it may be accepted pro tempore, and
subjected to .still more tests.

It is overwhelmingly impor-

tant to understand that science progresses only by f alsif ications

there is no "positive", accumulated evidence which

counts when the epistemological chips go down.

More empha-

tically, science does not produce "probable" theories, nor
-are facts irrefragably "established".

At any moment, the

most highly regarded theory may be overthrown by a single
refutation, touching off a "scientific revolution".

Such

is the Popperian Logic of Scientific Discovery, the "scientia negativa" (Agassi).
This Popperian theory, however, suffers from one ex-

19

cruciating drawback1

it is incognate with reality.

Inspec-

tion of the available scientific laboratories failed to
turn up significant evidence of any refutations in progress.
The scientists, after all, were not consulted in advance,
and perhaps could not be expected to live up to the extrinsic norms prescribed for them.
chink in the

~heory's

There was an empirical

logical armor, and it was here that

the opposition aimed their blowsa
••• I should like to raise before them [the
Popperians] the spectre of the history of
spectroscopy between 1870 and 1900. I think
it fair to describe this period as one of
mapping, in which the spectra of the
elements were described with ever increasing
precision. There is precious little 'refutation' going on here, yet it would be hard
to deny Angstrom the title of scientist.31
That there is normal science ••• is the outstanding, the crashingly obvious fact which
confronts and hits any philosophers of science
who set out, in a practical or technological
manner, to do any actual scientific research •
••• real science (basic research, applied,
technological, are all alike here) ••• is
normally a habit-governed, puzzle-solving
activity, not a fundem~ntally upheaving or
falsifying activity ••• J2
With Kuhn's arrival, the doubts snowballed, and the
. opposition grew even more strident.

He wrote, referring to

the alleged falsification experiences. fllndeed, I doubt
that the latter exist ... 33

For him, science consists, not of

the single-minded pursuit of refutati.ons, but of a succession
of periods of "normal science," interrupted by revolutions.
During normal science, research proceeds inside the circum-
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vallatory boundaries of a well defined community of investigators~

with a concrete solution to some past problem em-

braced as a "paradigm" for the solution of the remaining
difficulties.

This paradigm-bound activity, what most

scientists do, most of the time, is "puzzle solving," and
is not at all directed toward falsification, but instead
presupposes the truth of the underlying communal view of
nature.

Eventually

resist solution in this

some~problems

vein; the anomalies become major embarassments.

There is

much distress in the profession -- even respectable men are
failing -- and a crisis usually results.

At this point a

solution to the refractory problem(s) is brought forward
which is not modelled on the· old paradigm.

Arguments that

"cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or
mathematical proof"3 4 ensue. In the end the community as a ·
whole comes round to the new solution, the revolution
triumphs, and a new paradigm reigns, whence another cycle
begins, like the endless palace revolts of a banana republie.
The question inevitably surfaces as to how Popper
ever mired himself so intractably in this quicksand of hortatory assertion.

Here two questions must be distinguished.

The first is how he got into it.

The second is why he

didn't get out of it.
The initial error probably had its roots in the

•

special characteristics of Viennese culture during and after
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World War I.

There language (or rather, Language) had just

replaced the recently deceased and plangently elegized deity
as the authoritative source for last judgments.

It has been

written that "For Karl Kraus the word has personal life.
Language, passion and thought are one and the same for him.
Language is the name of the activity of his passionate
thinking; his passion and thought are identical with their

.

articulation,"35 but he was only the first magnitude star of
a large and glittering galaxy, whose lesser luminaries included Hofmannsthal and Wittgenstein himself.

Popper kept

a low profile for the duration of this linguistic Verkldrte
Nacht, but did not entirely escape its influences.3 6 Confronted by the diverse claims to scientific status of Marxism, Relativity, and the psychologies of Adler and Freud,
he hoped to find the guiding thread out of this labyrinth
supplied by language, even as he realized that language
only marked out a path made by other agents.

Initially

posing his problem not as a choice between different kinds
-of activities, or types of commitments, but as the "problem

of drawing a line (as well as this can be done) between the
.statements, or systems of statements, of the empirical
sciences, and all other statements -- whether they are of a
religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudoscientific, "J? Popper proposed his falsification criterion
as the solution to this "problem of demarcation," as he
still refers to it.3 8

!

L
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In this view, statements possessing scientific
character were those deemed "capable of conflicting with
possible, or conceivable, observati~ns ... 39 All others, while
they might well be meaningful, belonged to some other realm,
and did not pertain to science, save as a source of conjectures.

And although Popper strenuously opposed the subse-

quent search by the Wiener Kreis for a criterion of a statement's meaning, and insisted that the question of linguistic
meaning was of exiguous import, still the first fatal step
off into the clouds had been taken.

For much is meaningful

-- as Popper knew well -- that is not scientific.

A for-

tiori, however, there is much that can be the subject of
some abstractly possible test which is of no scientific
interest whatsoevers questions of language have an lncomparably vaster scope than those of science.

The concrete,

active character of the political economy of knowledge got
lost in

~

philosophical dispute

~

demarcation.

This re-

luctance to recognize the diverse interests of philosophy
and actual science colors all of Popper's subsequent oeuvre,
indeed, as Masterman remarkss
At the earliest opportunity ••• Popper leaves
discussion of scientific theories altogether
to turn to philosophic theories. in order to
analyze, brilliantly, whether these are not
also, in a more direct way, refutable. He
then, bar a hairsbreadth, equates these with
scientific theories1 and one suspects that
••• it is these, and not science as it really
~~!c~i~:.U8s had at the back of his mind

!1i
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The result was that Popper, the philosopher of
Kantian filiation, who was interested in the condition of
all possible experience, but who also averred that "I •••
have no personal interest in matters of commerce, or in
commercially minded people, 1141 ended up claiming in effect
to find his theory confirmed in the relentless pursuit by
entrepreneurial science of the conditions of all possible

.

profitable experience.
Now Popper's theory of science was not conceived in
a vacuum, and this is the key to its indurate success.

For

Popper, philosophical problems always came in from the cold,
i.e., originated outside of philosophy. 42 Some were suggested by the natural sciences, art spun off others, and
the social sciences were considered to provide still more.
Not the least of these wellsprings of philosophy was politics, and Popper could scarcely have been less veiled about
the political implications of his theories.

Relishing his

starring role in the weighty drama whose plot -- the 2000
year old struggle to entrench the "Open Society" -- he outlined in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society
And Its Enemies, 4 3 Popper promoted his generalized philosophy of science, of "Critical Rationalism," as the exclusively suitable ethos of that improbably porous community,
with which current, Western, more-or-J.ess (often, notably,
less) Liberal states were extensively identified&

•

••• my optimism lies entirely in •Y inter-
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made the other look good, and together they were mutually
conducive to the enlistment of unified belief.

Popperians

routinely identified epistemological dissent with incipient
totalitarianism, 4 9 and the good Critical Rationalist, like
Thomas Mann's liberal artist, was a bohemian only in the
realm of ideas; for revolution in thought, evolution
"piecemeal" evolution -- in politics.SO

One cannot, however,

lightly abandon positions whose wreckage implies, not merely
the defeat of a school, but the Decline of the West.

Rather,

what in other circumstance would be regarded as arrant pertinacity presents itself as of transcendent obligation.

As

a consequence, the theory had precious little room for maneuvering, when its fundemental thesis -- that science progresses by falsification --

~am~

into qu.ttation.

Kuhn, for his part, has professed that "Whatever
scientific progress may be, we must account for it by examining the nature of the scientific group, discovering what
it values, what it tolerates, and what it disdains ... 51 But
he is no more willing than Popper to admit that among the
constitutive community values might be those of power and
moneys that for instance, American physicists have for years
forsworn theoretical research in favor of more remunerative
experimental investigations, even though the theoretical
results, when there are any, possess demonstrably greater
value.5 2 His critique updates the image of what scientists
actually do, to accord more with the .institutional reality,
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but never leaves the established realm of liberal legitimacy.
In a word, his image is of a later vintage than Popper's,
but still elides the brutal realities of the political
economy of knowledge.

This is why he is shocked, like

Cardinal Bellarmine confronted by Galileo, at the debilitating thrust of Feyerabend's criticisma
••• to describe the argument of Feyerabend's
as a defense of irrationality in science
seems to me not only absurd, but vaguely
obscene.SJ
And why he must try, in a classic statement of one-dimensional

rationality, to render reason virtually coextensive

with reflection on sciencea
To suppose ••• that we possess criteria of
rationality which are independen't of our
understanding of the essentie..ls of the
scientific process
to open the door to
cloud-cuckoo land.5

ks

So there Kuhn stands, dismally, able to do no other.

IV.

Feyerabend Abandons The Puzzles.
But Reason is cunning.

It was a quondam Popperian

who brought to consciousness the suppressed interest in emancipation latent in Popper's philosophy of science.

It was

Feyerabend who, in the Republic of Science, assumed the role
of Lenin to Popper's Kerensky.
Feyerabend had earlier showed in a classic series of
papers, directed mainly at Nagel, that the presence of competing
theories was a precondition for f8.l.sification, and consequently for progress in science.

He thus redirected the
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interest in research away from the Popperian stress on the
use of logic as the "Organon of Criticism, .. 55 and back to
the actual development of science.

He developed a view of

perception which, while it had unmistakable Popperian antecedents, was novel in the stress placed on the ineliminable
ideational elements of all observations; that they were
always "theory-laden."
highly

origin~l

Extending this insight through a
6
analysis of the case of Gagileo,5 he

showed that what counts as "observational" has an "historical characters" that it depends quite often on old and
senile theories, scarcely consciously held at all (assumptions about the medium in which observations are made, expectations of what is to be observed, etc.).

Moreover, one

can criticize these theories only on the basis of other
observations, themselves equally theoretical.

A correct

general theory may thus be rejected, not because it is itself deficent, but solely because the wrong "observational"
theories are providing the evidence which is used against
.its that in other words, "observational" theories can develop
~

of phase with more general ones.
In such a situation, where the-"evidence" is over-

whelmingly against a new theory, the recreant are likely to
despair and kick away their revolution.

The alternative,

Feyerabend argued, is to admit any and all theories, and
let their proponents concoct the "observational" facts their
theorles need to acquire plausibility.

Normal science flies

27

in the face of such a reversal of the customary relation of
theory and practice, and so draws Feyerabend's ire.
First he points to the monolithic character of normal science, its disquieting likeness to an intellectual
Brave New Worlds
The recipe, according to these people, is to
restrict criticism, to reduce the number of
theories to one ••• Students must be prevented
from speculating along different lines and more
restless colleagues must be made to conform
and 'to do serious work'. Is this what Kuhn
wants to achieve?57
Then he shows that puzzle-solving as a criterion for normal science's existence comports organized crime, or even
Oxford philosophy, just as well.

This is-because, he

charges, Kuhn "has failed to discuss the aim of science ... 5

8

Now the aim of normal science, even for Kuhn, is to
create the conditions for scientific revolution.

But Feyer-

abend considers Kuhn to err in prescribing a puzzle-solving
effort, "the ·most boring and most pedestrian part of the
scientific enterprise, .. 59 as the optimal strategy.

Instead

proliferation of theories must precede a revolution.

And

such progress as there is in science is due to the transformations in the quotidian, "less humanitarian

1160

normal

science 'component', forced by prior theoretical proliferation in the often invisible, but omnipresent 'philosophical
component.'
With the cat this far out of the bag, Feyerabend
plunges forward, .£2!1 brio.

Most scientists, he asserts,
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resist changes in the philosophical components they are often
not even aware there is one. 61 Contemporary scientific
education
has the purpose of carrying out a rationalistic
simplification of the process·•science' by
simplifying its participants. One proceeds as
follows. First, a domain of research is
defined. Next, the domain is separated from
the remainder of history (physics, for example,
is separated from metaphysics and from theology)
and receives a 'logic' of its own. A thorough
training in such a logic then conditions those
working in the domain so that they may not unwittingly disturb the purity (reada the sterility) that has already been achieved. An essential
part of the training is the inhibitions of intuitions that might lead to a blurring of boundaries. A person's religion, for example, or
his metaphysics, or his sense of humor must not
have the slightest connection with his scientific
activity. His imagination is restrained and
even his language will cease to be his own.62
So why would

any~ne

words!)" 63 at all?

want to be "truly scientific (dreaded
Why indeed?

Unless the answer is "brain-

washing"64 or the machinations of "Stalinists, in politics
as well as in the philosophy of science.• 6 5 interested in
preserving "their basic myth. 1166
Feyerabend sees but one hope for amelioration&

we

must abandon the "normal" practice of science for proliferation -- ''revival of astrology, wi thcraft, magic, alchemy,
elaboration of Leibniz's Monadology, and so on, 116 7 always
remembering that the "sciences, after al.1, are our own
creation, including all the severe standards they seem to
impose on us, 1168 and that "the choice.:!:!!,~ basic cosmology
may become.! matter of taste." 69 •
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Kuhn bristles at this suggestion that normal science
be abandoned.

He objects that depriving science of its nor-

mal science puzzles will destroy the progressive character
of sciences

By their nature revolutions cannot be the
whole of sciences something different must
necessarily go on in between.70
In the developed sciences, unlike philosophy,
it is.technical puzzles that provide the usual
occasion and often the concrete materials for
revolution.'l 1
Only after it [the transition to normal science]
occurs does progress ~ecome an obvious characteristic of a field. 7
Feyerabend answers by reeling off an example of progress without puzzlesa
This objection is refuted by the Presocratics
who progressed (their theories did not just
change, they were also improved) without
paying the slightest attention to puzzles.
Of course, they did not produce the patterns
normal science -- revolution -- normal science
revolution, etc., in which professional stupidity
is periodically replaced by philosophical outbursts only to return again at a 'higher level'. 73
There is, however, something most curious about this
proposed model.

In no way is it analogous to industrial

science, and it does not appear at all compatible with any
of the enterprises sketched in section two of this paper.
Those conversant with the theories of Marx or the story of
Midas, will have no difficulties imagining why; for the rest,
even a nominal perspicacity should suffice for the detection
of the heavy, if invisible, hand of the political economy of

JO

knowledge at work.
solving is not.

For puzzle-solving is supported, problem-

I. B. M. now smugly advertises that it has

philosophers on its payroll, but the effectiveness of the
pitch depends on its shock value.

There can be knowledge,

scholarship, academic rank and tenure, perhaps even progress
of a sort in efforts such as that of the Pre-Socratics, but

I

I
t

I

nothing at all resembling contemporary science.
Feyerabend

.
see

Why doesn't

this?

Here an unsettling question insinuates itself.

Per-

haps Feyerabend does grasp the facts of this integration.
Possible, he doesn't care.
come into focusa

Slowly the question begins to

Are Kuhn and Feyerabend interested in the

same sorts of things?
I am certain that the answer is no, that Feyerabend's
explicit raising of the normative issue portends something
far more drastic than another theory of the nature of science.
The easiest way to demonstrate this is to inquire into what
Kuhn is interested in.

The answer isa

what is modern science interested in?

modern science.

Now,

The answer to this

question is adumbrated by Habermasa

f

I
'

The modern sciences produce ••• knowledge whose
form (and not subjective intention) is that of
technically applicable knowledge, although 4he
application usually comes only much later. 7
Working in a different tradition. Habermas fills out
the scheme implied in the above formulation in his essay
"Erkenntnis und Interesse"a
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Three categories of investigation-processes
allow the ascertainment of specific connections
of logico-methodological rules and knowledgeconsti tutive interests ••• In the formulation
of the empirical-analytic s ciences a technical
interest is incorporated. 75
It would be hopeless, and, felicitously, unnecessary to explicate the whole of Habermas's position in this paper.
Nevertheless, since his discussion of science is the only
one current which manifests explicit awareness of the political economy of knowledge, a few key passages may usefully
be inserted, for they throw Feyerabend's arguments into
sharp relief a

'

In the empirical-analytic sciences,. the
system of reference, which prejudges the
meaning of possible statements, specifies
rules for both the construction and the
testing of theories. Theories are hypotheticdeductive systems of statements, which allow
the derivation of empirically meaningful lawhypotheses. These are interpreted as statements
of covariance between observable events, and
allow predictions according to postulated
initial conditions. Empirical-analytic knowledge
therefore is possible predictive knowlenge. The
meaning of such predictions, i.e., their
technical applicability, only results from the
rules according to which we apply the theory
to reality ••• We can say that facts and the
relations between them can be grasped "descriptively", but this mode of speech must not be
allowed to conceal the fact that the relevant
scientific facts constitute themselves only
through a preceding organization of our
experience in the functional system of instrumental action ••• empirical scientific theories
disclose reality under the guiding interest
of possible consolidation and ~~pansion of
information-controlled action.r 0
Habermas himself pointed to the differences between
Popper and himself, exhibiting a proper -- and wholly justi-
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f ied -- confidence that where his theory diverged from
Critical Rationalism, it did so in the direction of greater
verisimlitude to the actual conduct of scientific researchJ
he could account for the puzzles.

But the potential cri-

tical dimension in Popperianism eluded him.

Feyerabend

found it, hidden in the emphasis on falsification.
fication is !121
by itself.

~

Falsi-

technically oriented activity at all, not

Discovering what a thing is not affords no auto-

matic amplification of existing manipulative skills, although
it is trivially true that any positive assertion can be
expressed as a double negation.

This is why the National

Science Foundation finances only historical research on the
Pre-Socratics, and it is the gravamen of Feyerabend•s charge
to Kuhn.

Expressed in Habermas's termiuGlogy, Feyerabend

is proposing a reversal of the "knowledge-constl,tutive
interest .. characteristic of science since the Renaissance.

I
1

Only on this ·1evel does the argument finally cohere.
It is thus the intent of Feyerabend's argument to
~eprive

puzzles of their function.

Without the puzzles,

however, industrialized science grinds to a halt.

From the

viewpoint of industrialized science, this might be considered
malefic.

Such is the charge brought against Feyerabend.
In a brief note published a few years ago, Feyerabend

suggested that two paradoxes of induction, the celebrated
Paradox of the Ravens, and the equally notorious Goodman
conundrum, the so-called "new Riddle of Induction," could be

JJ

evaded by considering only negative, i.e., falsifying, instances to count in theory evaluation.

Since these problems

originate in justificational (i.e., problems of positive
evidence) perplexities, they would both be emulsified in the
scientia negativa.

Subsequently he has suggested, not al-

together implausibly, that excessive interest in such questions is pathological.77

He concluded by imploring philoso-

phers of science
to terminate the discussion of such red herrings
as these and to concentrate upon the more rewarding task of advancing knowledge by the
criticism of Qld hypotheses and the suggestion
of new ones. 7~
·
T. W. Settle, in a finely written reply. objected that
Feyerabend is right in his discussion of
scientific method, but not in his discussion
of induction. Contrary to most WI·iters in the
philosophy of science I do not think that
knowledge grows by induction. .But contrary
to the usual opponents of inductivism I do not
think induction can be dismissed, simply
because it lacks this role in science.7~
Settle is here walling off science from the rest of human
experience.

He postulates that the procedures involved in

science are of a radically different kind from any other
variety of human knowledge.

These other fields grow posi-

' tively, by some sort of mysterious inductive process which
eludes the Popperian reduction of induction to hopeful
conjecture, which is then taken as a basis for action on
a wing and a prayer. 80 But why does he want
a

The answer is no surprise, when one reflect

J4

tical economy of knowledge.

Settle sharply distinguishes

the quasi-philosophical "science" from technology, pro-

I'

testing that
••• the role which confirmation plays in
technology is ignored by Feyerabend ••• 81
and then boils down his objection to the charge that acceptance of Feyerabend's proposal would be bad for business1
conf i:rmation is indispensible in such more
or less intellectual human pursuits as technology, banking, child-rearing, jurisprudence,
insurance, politics, and industry.~2
Shoddy science, entrepreneurial science, reckless science,
and dirty science could ask for nothing more, right down to
the invocation of Mother ("child rearing")~

The critical

dimension drops from sight, and Hegel's Weltgeist strides
across the pages of the British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science -- "der Gang Gottes in der Welt" -- as Settle
proposes to make institutional practices (e.g., entrepre-

i

neurial science) self-justifyinga
Solutions to the problems of induction are
likely to be provided by institutional, even
legal, standards of what is to be §Qunted
as sufficient positive evidence ••• J

I
t
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-V.

The Withering Away of Natural Science.

So the battle lines are drawn. Industrialized science -- the "alienation of reason" 84 -- or "revival of
astrology, witchcraft, magic, alchemy, elaboration of
Leibniz's Monadology, and so on." 8 5 What can be said about
the probable outcome?
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In the short run, the implications are clear.

The

admixture of a little vulgar Marxism is wonderfully conducive to reliable vaticination.

I
I
'

the Gesellschaft will get.

What the Gesellschaft wants,

The New Industrial State is not

imaginable, save with its characteristic middle adjective.
But Ravetz cautions that although it "might seem far-fetched
and alarmist to claim that science is in danger of decline
and dissolution, through its inability to make a healthy
response to its new conditions," still, "the history of
natural science in Europe shows that its steady growth over
the past centuries has been an aggregate of cycles of growth

I

and decline in different fields and plaees ••• it would be
astonishing if it were not so, for then natural science
would be the only sort of creative work exempt from such
rhythm, 1186 and the more remote future poses some interesting
questions.
Here ·the answer, I think, must be very much more
tentative. Ravetz hints in worried tones of a decline in
."morale", 8 7 manifested in "certain recognizable symptoms
rather than hard cases." 88 Then there is the obdurate "disappointment in the recruitment to science, measured by the
number of students electing to study science at university
and also continuing into research," 8 9 as well as a "decline
in the quality of science teaching in the schools."90
are portents of some gravity, and not unexpected.

These

It stands

to reason that the mantle of explorer of nature was more

J6

appealing than a grey flannel suit.

Far more significant

than any of these, however, may be the long run change in

,

the intellectual climate.
The Zeitgeist is restless.

One can observe in the

-.····.·.·

developed countries
any reference to

the only kind this discussion has
an exfoliant feeling of disillusionment

with science and its attendant rationality, a disquieting

.

intuition that the blossoming of science and technology was
really the sprouting of Les Fleurs du Ma1.

In this move-

ment, PaulFeyerabend's off-handed remark that
••• we may construct a world in which it
[science1 plays no role whatever (such a
world, rventure to suggest, wou1d be more
pleasant than the world we live in today).91
will bulk ever larger.

Ravetz hopes for a "critical science"

with "the relation of the scientist to the external world"
being "fundamentally different."9 2 Perhaps a short term
movement into an environmentally conscious Eco-biology might
come to resemble such a science.

I suspect, howe_ver, that

this is too sanguines that the withering away of natural
science may already have begun.

•
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1Liberalism is a pie which many philosophers enjoy
cutting up; no single definition of the term is likely to
conform to all the popular usages. For this paper "Liberalism" may be understood as the polite equivalent of the
rather more unfashionable expression "bourgeois thought,"
that is, the thought forms the predominance of which
attended and results from the rise of the modern industrial
state. For more extended discussions and invaluable theoretical background cf. Karl Marx, "Vorwort," in his Zur
Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie (Berlins Duncker, 1839),
and Karl Mannheim, Ideolo~r and Utopia (New Yorks Harcourt, Brace & World, 193 , especially pp. 122-23. My
interest in stipulating this definition is only to satisfy
the following adequacy conditions for a more theoretical
definitions 1) That Liberalism be considered historically,
with no one particular epistemological or political view
held to be the essence of Liberalism; 2) That the reformist
posture of Liberalism be clearly recognized; J) Most of all,
that no one be unduly exercised when it is discovered that
not every "Liberal" thinker subscribed to all the tenets
which might be included in a Liberal catechism; figures
such as Bacon present especially trucing cases here.
Of course, it is taken for granted that Keynesianism and Liberalism are now virtually co-terminus, and
accordingly no argument is offered for the implied suggestion that Galbraith and Price are paradigmatic Liberals of
the present day.
2Karl Popper, "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften,"
in Th. W. Adorno, ed., Der Positivismusstreit in der
deutschen Soziologie (Frankfurta Luchterhand, 1971), p. 114.
Unless otherwise indicated, all the translations from the
qerman in this paper were done by me.
JT. s. Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics," in
Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge (Cambridgea Cambridge University Press, 1970),
'p.

263.

4For a sketch of the differences, whose import may
be variously assessed, cf. Alan Musgrave, "Kuhn's Second
Thoughts," in the British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, XXII, No. 3 (1971), PP• 287-97.
Soon K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Oxford Paperbacks Oxfords Oxford University Press, 1968).
6John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State
(2nd edition, reviseds Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 1971).
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7Price, Scientific Estate, p. 19.
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Power."

Galbraith, Industrial State, p. 284n.
9cf. his Chapter 5, "The Spactrum from Truth to

10Price, Scientific Estate, p. 111.
11 John Kenneth Galbraith, "Economics as a System of
Belief," in his Economics, Peace, and Laughter (New Yorka
New American Library, 1972), PP• 57-58.
12
Ibidl', P• 59.
!JThe Popper corpus is scattered through forty years
of books and journals, in several languages. I use in particular "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften," in Positivismusstreit, pp. 103-231 this is Popper's own summary of his
position. For comments on the paper cf. David Frisby's
"The Popper-Adorno Controversy& The Methodological Dispute in German Sociology," in Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, II, No. 2 (1972), pp. 105-19.
I have aimed for the minimal degree of complication
commensurate with precision of argument, consequently this
paper does not consider recent developitents by Imre Lakatos
of what is essentially a Popperian position. Cf. inter alia,
his "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes," in Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-195. Neither
does this paper attempt a detailed criticism of Feyerabend's
methodological anarchism. However, it is worth noting that
the residual Liberalism which his recen~ papers exude is
not nearly as far removed from Popperianism as Feyerabend
seems to think. In this connection Nore'tta Koertge's "For
and Against Method," British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, XXIII, No. 3 (1972), pp. 274-89. missed the most
important point, although it is heartening to observe the
abandonment by the British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science of its fond fantasy that it could masquerade as a
journal of the philosophy of science, without simultaneously
being a journal of politics, of anthropology, of economics,
·and of sociology.
14Kuhn has several times reformulated his position.
Some have sensed tergiversation, e.g., s. E. Toulmin, "Does
the Distinction between Normal and Revo1utionary Science
Hold Water?", in Growth of Knowledge, pp. 39-47. I use the
revised edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(2nd revised edition; Chicagoa University of Chicago Press,
1970), with special attention to the "Postscript -- 1969°.
1 5on the probable indistinguishability of the two,
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cf. H. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science (revised edition1
Chicagoa · Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 110-141 his book is a
pioneering study of the State and science, lamentably generally unknown among philosophers. A secondary aim of this
paper is to make a start toward bringing together the literature in economics and th& social sciences on science, and
confronting it with the central tradition in philosophy of
science, so that the criticism (and not "methodology") of
science can be carried through as a critique of political
economy in a very elongated sense.

16cr. Jtlrgen Habermas, "Technik und Wissenschaft als

Ideologie," in Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie
(Frankfurta ~urkamp, 1968), pp. 72-7J.

1 7cf. Galbraith's Industrial State, but see also

Ralph Miliband's "Professor Galbraith and American Capitalism," in Economics, ed., David Mermelstein (New York a Random House, 1970), pp. 531-42.
Yorka

18Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New
Monthly Review Press, 1966).

l9Robert Eisner, Review of New Industrial State, in
uarterl Review of Economics and Business, VII, No. 3(1967),
p. J. Here I employ the traditional language of "factors"
of production without prejudice to the issue of its long
run utility for economic analysis1 cf. Ernest Mandel, The
Formation of the Economic Thou ht of Karl Marx (New York&
Monthly Review Press, 1971 , pp. 92-93, for a vigorous argument.
20The most illuminating work on this subject, but

recently published, is Jerome Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge
its Social Problems (Oxfords Clarendon Press, 1971),
whose analysis provides a detailed background for that
undertaken here.
21 cr. supra, Notes J, S and 6.
and

22For the term, and a sketch of the nascent theory,

·cf. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (Quadrangle
edition; Chicagoa Quadrangle, 1967), The theory varies
distinctly in its emphasis on some topics from the treatments referred to in Notes 5 and 6, and is rather similar
to that of Habermas, cf. supra, Note 4.

23Ravetz, Knowledge and Social Problems, p. 44.
24Ibid., p. 45.
•
25Ibid., p. 48.
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26 Ibid., pp.
55-56.
27Ibid., pp.
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54-55.

28 Ibid,, p.
57.
2 9cf. Paul K. Feyerabend, "Classical Empiricism,"
in R. Butts, ed., The Methodolo ical Herita e of Newton
(Torontoa University of Toronto Press, 1970 , pp. 150-170.
JOPopper, "Logik," p. 106. Those addicted to logomachy may debate whether this translation catches all the
nuances of " ••• alle Kritik besteht in Widerlegungsversuchen."

.

JlL, Pearce Williams, "Normal Science, Scientific
Revolutions and the History of Science," in Growth of Knowledge, p. so.
32ooargaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm,"
in Growth of Knowledge, p. 60.
J3Kuhn, Structure of Revolutions. p• 146.
34 Ibid. , p, 199.

3~rich Heller, "Karl Kraus," in his The Disinherited
Mind (New Yorka World Publishing Company·. 1965), p. 239.
On Vienna, science and philosophy in twenties, cf. also
William Johnston, The Austrian Mind (Berkeleya University
of California Press, 1972), especially Chapter 13 (and p.
401 for Popper); "Kraus, Loos, and Wi ttger.a.stein," in Letters
from Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Paul Engeimaan, trans. L.
Furtmtlller (Oxfords Blackwell, 1967), pp. 122-32.
36 rn what follows on Popper, I make heavy use of his
own account of the genesis of his theories in "Science 1
Conjectures and Refutations," in his Con.ie<ctures and Refutations (Harper edition1 New Yorka Harper & Row, 1968), pp.

33-65.

37Ibid., p. 39· Given this crystal:-clear formulation
of his view8; and the equally limpid reiteration of them in
"The Demarcation Between Science and Meta.~usics," in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 257 and p. 267, one is hard
pressed to understand John Losee's apparent avowal that
Popper concerned himself with the tension ·~etween scientific
method and illicit "conventionalism", to tile exclusion of
concern with statements themselves. Actua21..ly, he was concerned with both. Cf. Losee's A Histor.icail Introduction to
the Philosophy of Science (Oxfords Oxford University Press,
1972), p. 190. This is not to affirm that Popper was inter-
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ested in meaning; he was not.
Partly because he does not formulate his theories of
science in the consuetudinary linguistic manner, Polany,
who is interested in the kinds of commitments scientists
make, is regularly traduced by his opponents, who don't
u..riderstand him. Cf., for instance, Lakatos, "Methodology,"
in Growth of Knowledge, pp. 92-93·
3 8cf. his "The Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics," in Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 253-292.
J9Popper, "Science," P• 39·
40Masterman, "Paradigm," P• 72.
41 Popp~r, The O en Societ

and Its Enemies, Vol. Ia
The Spell.of Plato 4th revised editions New Yorks Harper
& Row, 1963), p. 295. The quotation continues as followsa
"But the influence of commercial initiative seems to me
rather important." The key word here is "initiative"; commerce is conceived as wholly external to the real product
of science; Ravetz, of course, does nicely as a refutation
of this view. Popper's attitude is manifested in his "In
my opinion, the 'economic conditions' or the 'social relations' of science are themes which can easily be overdone,
and which are likely to degenerate into platitude;" Open
Society, Vol. Ila The Hlp;h Tide of Prophecys Hegel, Marx,
and the Aftermath, p. 107. Of course, if the link with epistemology is broken, platitudes are the likely result.
42Popper, "The Nature of Philosophical Problems and
Their Roots in Science," in Conjectures and Refutations, p.
72.
4 3The Poverty of Historicism (Jrd editions New Yorka
Harper & Row, 1961)1 for the Open Society cf. supra, n. 19.
44Karl Popper, "The History of Our Timea An Optimist's View," in Conjectures and Refutations, p. J65.
4 5Ibid., P• J69.
46~.

4 7Ibid., P• 376.
48 Ibid., P• 375.
4 9cf. Popper's contribution to Revolution Oder Reforms Herbert Marcuse und Karl Po er -- Eine Konfrontation, ed. Franz Stark Jrd editions Muni.cha KBselVerlag, 1972)r his letter to Claus Grossner on Adorno,

42

J

Habermas, and "revolutionary students," in Claus Grossner,
Verfall der Philoso}hie (Reinbeck bei Hamburg1 Christian
Wegner Verlag, 1971 , pp. 278-89, and Grossner's essay, pp.
136-501 Albert's "Kleines verwundertes Nachwort zu einer
grossen Einleitung," in Positivismusstreit, p. 3391 and
Imre Lakatos, "Methodology," in Growth of Knowledge, p. 93•
"Thus Kuhn's position would vindicate, no doubt, unintentionally, the basic political credo of contemporary religious maniacs ('student revolutionaries')." Lakatos, whose
own commitment to Popperianism might be not unfairly described as "devout", is here using the term "religious"
simply as a club to intimidate his opponents.
50The formulas "Revolution in the intellect, evolution in politics," comes from the Popper letter to
Grossner, cf. supra, n. J7; "piecemeal" social engineering
is a favorite Popperian slogan.
51Kuhn, "Reflections On My Critics," in Growth of
Knowledge, p. 238.
5 2cr. Barry Castro, "The Scientific Opportunities
Foregone Because of More Readily Available Federal Support
for Research in Experimental than Theoretical Physics,"
in The Journal Rf.PoliticaJ_l;conomy, LXXVI, No. 4, Part I
(July/August, 19b8), pp. 601-14; also Kenneth Boulding,
"The Scientific-Military-Industrial Complex," in The Virginia Quarterly Review, XLIII, No. 4 (1967), pp. 676-771
"The scientific estate, alas, swills as enthusiastically at
the trough of the contract state as their more worldly
brethern in the profit-making, and alas, even in the nonprofit-making, institutions." To those not professionally
in the philosophy of science, this conclusion will of
course partake of a certain obviousness.
53Kuhn, "Reflections," in Growth of Knowledge, p. 264.
54 Ibid.
55Popper, "Logik," p. 115.
56 Paul K. Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism, Part
II," in R. G. Colodny, ed., The Nature and Function of
Scientific Theories (Pittsburgha University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1970), pp~ 275-353·
57Feyerabend, "Consolations for 'the Specialist," in
Growth of Knowledge, P• 198.
SSibid., p. 201.
59Ibid., p. 209,
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60 rbid., p. 212.
61

Ibid., p. 213.

62Feyerabend, "Against Method," in Radner and Winokur, ed., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
Vol. IV1 bnalyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and
Psycholog;Y, (Minneapolisa University of Minnesota Press,
1970), p. 20. This may well have been dismissed as hyperbole i:l many Q'\arters. It is not; the condition seriously
affects produf~vity in resea~ch.labor::-tories, cf. D. Davies,
"A Scarce Res<b..ece Called Curiosity," in D. Lamberton, ed.,
Eco.r,.o!ni>s of Information and Knowledge (Middlesex, Englanda
Penguin Books, 197ri·, pp. 315-22. It was to be expected that
as scientif~~;.~education expanded, curiosity would become a
scarce reso~~'t.S and thus its price would rise. Alas, curiosity as a hflman trait which cannot be bought, and here may
be an irresolvable contradiction in capitalism. This argument should be considered in the light of the last section
of this paper.
6 3Feyerabend, "Against Method," p. 72.

64Ibid., P• 20.
6 5Ibid., P• 101, n27B.
66Feyerabend, "Consolations," p. 212.
6 7Feyerabend, "Against Method," p. 106, n41.
68 Ibid., P• 90.
6 9Ibid., P• 91.

70Kuhn, "Reflections, " p. 242.
7libid., P• 247.
7 2 Ibid., p. 245.
7JFeyerabend, "Consolations," p. 208, n2.
74Habermas, "Technik und Wissenschaft," pp. 72-73: I
have translated from the German this passage and those which
follow.
75Habermas, "Erkenntnis und Interesse," in his book
Technik und Wissenschaft, p. 155; the other two "investigation-processes" are irrelevant in this context.
76 rbid., pp. 156-57. That knowledge-constitutive
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interests can in fact, if not necessarily in Habermas, be
affected by conscious human choice must be pressed with some
urgency. (This is not thereby to imply that one can privately reconstitute the world anew just before climbing out
of bed in the morning.) Habermas, in his more tenebrous
formulations, seems sometimes to treat "interest" as if "es
sich nicht um wirkliche, nicht einmal um politische Interessen, sondern um reine Gedanken handelt •.• ," (Karl Marx,
Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, Werke [!¥th editions
Berlins Dietz, 1969], III, p. 39); Feyerabend, with his profusion of concrete proposals, is clear that he intends no
such stale (and Quietistic) Kantianism; one can only regret
the obstacles which Habermas' relentlessly opaque style
creates to the enlistment of critical assent.
In "The Dialectical Foundations of Critical Theorya
Jttrgen Habermas' Metatheoretical Investigations," Telos,
No. 12 (Summer, 1972), pp. 93-114, Trent Shroyer employs a
notion, alleged to be derived from Habermas, of an "invariant" (technical, etc.) interest; a view to which this
essay is diametrically opposed. Constraints of time and
space impel me to prescind from all the excellent points
made in his paper, and merely to suggest a few of the reasons that undergird my conviction that the notion of "invariance" is false both to theory and to practice.
First, Shroyer's view that "the Im.sic orientation of
man to nature re1nains an ever-transformi.Qg, yet logical:iy
invariant, relation of instrumental actl*1" (p. 101), is
historically inadequate. It is simply not true that all
ages and cultures have confronted nature with an eye toward
extensive and expeditious plunder (the •technical interest").
Not even all "science", but only the Western, post-Renaissance version of it approaches nature from such a warped and
truncated perspective. Even the very suggestion of an "evertransforming ••• relation of instrumental action" would have
appeared preposterous to nearly every major school of
thought prior to Vico.
Secondly, statements such as "Valid beliefs are universal propositions ••• " (p. 101) only pump more hot air into
a scientistic balloon, and thereby camouf.lage the chaotic
reality of the actual problem-situation in the sciences,
where, as Feyerabend has put it, "not a single theory ever
· agrees with all the known facts in its domain" (''Against
Method," p. J6). In this instance one sees clearly how the
so-called "Critical Theory" now depends for its plausibility on a regressive image of science, and how that theory
helps to conceal the political foundations of contemporary
scientific self-understanding, thereby supporting the pretensions of the Positivism it claims to unmask.
??Paul K. Feyerabend, "Philosophy of Sciences A
Subject With A Great Past," in Roger Stuewer, ed., Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vo.l. Va Historical
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and Philoso hical Pers ectives of Science (Minneapolisa
University of Minnesota Press, 1970 , pp. 172-8J.
78Paul K. Feyerabend, "A Note on Two 'Problems• of
Induction," in the British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, XIX, No. J (1968), p. 253.
79T. w. Settle, "The Point of Positive Evidence -Reply to Professor Feyerabend," British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, XX, No. 4 (1969), P• 353·
8°For Popper's position, cf. especially "Sciences
Conjectures and Refutations," in Conjectures and Refutations,
pp. JJ-65. Here Popper manifests his awareness that the
entire Popperian theory of science depends on the existence
of a continuum between the acquisition of scientific knowledge and that obtained through common-sense; that as he
elsewhere puts ita " •.• scientific knowledge can be more
easily studied than common-sense knowledge. For it is
common-sense knowledge writ large, as it were:--rts very
problems are enlargements of the problems of common-sense
knowledge." ("Preface -- 1959," in The Logic of Scientific
Discovery (Londona Hutchinson, 1959), p. 22.) His position
is that inductions simply don't exist• that they are but
conjectures, for all the shouting and knitting of brows
which might accompany them. Settle wo\11.d have to explain
why some conjectures, and only those, qualify for the
honorific status of inductions.
81 settle, "Reply," p. 353·
82 Ibid., P• 354.
SJibid., P• 355.
84The phrase originates with Leszek Kolakowski.
85Feyerabend, "Against Method," p. 106, n41.
86Ravetz, Knowledge and Social Problems, p. 67.
S7Ibid., P• 58.
88Ibid.
S9Ibid.
90ibid., P• 59.
91Feyerabend, "Consolations," p. 228.
92Kavetz, Knowledge and Social Problems, p. 4JO.
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unreflective incorporation of a technical interest into
social science research projects accounts partially for the
oft-remarked ease with which their results are converted
into instruments of further manipulation. The consequences
for social science of a withering away of its paragon are
difficult to imagine, but should not be underestimated in
their magnitude. The price of "rigor" in a discipline such
as political science has been mortis. Devaluing natural
science would make it more likely that problem selection
would be governed by the character of reality, than -- as at
present -- by the state of existing theory •

r
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albert, Hans. "Kleines Verwunderte.s Nachwort zu einer grossen Einleitung." Der Positivismusstreit in der
deutschen Soziologie. Edited by Th. W. Adorno.
Frankfurta Luchterhand, 1971.
Baran, Paul, and Sweezy, Paul. Monopoly Capital.
Monthly Review Press, 1966.

New Yorka

Boulding, Kenneth. "The Scientific-Military-Industrial Complex.". The Virginia Quarterly Review, XLIII, No. 4
(196?), pp. 676-80.
Castro, Barry. "The Scientific Opportunities Foregone
Because of More Readily Available Federal Support
for Research in Experimental than Theoretical Physics." The Journal of Political Economy, LXXVI,
No. 4, Part I (1968), pp. 601-14.
Davies, D. "A Scarce Resource Called Curiosity." Economic_a..
of Information and Knowledge. Edited by D. Lamberton.
Middlesex, Englanda Penguin Books, 1971.
Eisner, Robert. Review of The New Industrial State by
John Kenneth Galbraith in Quarter!} Review of Economics and Business, VII, No. J (1967 , pp. 82-85.
Eugelmann, Paul. Letters From Ludwig Wittgenstein. Translated by L. F~rtmueller. Oxfords Basil Blackwell,

1967. '

Feyerabend, Paul. "Against Method." Minnesota Studies in
the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IVa Analyses of
Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology.
Edited by s. Radner and M. Winokur. Minneapolis&
University of Minnesota Press.
Empiricism."
----of"Classical
Newton. Edited by R.
of Toronto Press, 1970.

The Methodological Heritage
Butts. Torontoa University

"Consolationsfor the
----Growth
of Scientific
and A. Musgrave.
Press, 1970.

Specialist." Criticism and the
Knowledge. Edited by I. Lakatos
Cambridge& Cambridge University

"Note on Two 'Problems' of
----Journal
for the Philosophy

(1968), pp. 251-5J •

Induction." British
of Science, XIX, No. J

r

48

"Philosophy of Sciences A Subject With a Great Past."
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.
Va Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of
Science. Edited by Roger Stuewer. Minneapolisa
University of Minnesota Press, 19?0.
"Problems of Empiricism, Part II." The Nature and
Function of Scientific Theories. Edited by R. G.
Colodny. Pittsburgha University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1970.
Frisby, David. "The Popper-Adorno Controversy1 The Methodological Dispute in German Sociology." Philosophy of
the Social Sciences, II, No. 2 (1972), pp. 105-19.
Galbraith, John Kenneth.
Edition, revised.

The New Industrial State. Second
Boston& Houghton Mifflin, 1971.

Economics, Peace, and Laughter.
American Library, 1972.

New Yorka

New

Grossner, Claus. Verfall der Philosophie. Reinbeck by
Hamburg a Christian Wegner Verlag. 1971.
Haberman, JUrgen. Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie.
Frankfurt a Surkamp, 1968.
Heller, Erich. The Disinherited Mind.
Publishing Company, 1965.

New Yorka

World

Johnston, William. The Austrian Mind.
sity of California Press, 1972.

Berkeleya

Univer-

Koertge, Noretta. "For and Against Method." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XXIII, No. J
(1972), pp. 274-89.
Kolko, Gabriel.
Edition.

The Triumph of Conservatism.
Chicagoa Quadrangle, 1967.

Quadrangle

Kuhn, Thomas s. Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Second, revised edition. Chicagoa University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
"Reflections on My Critics." Cri'ticism and the Growth
of Knowledge. Edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave.
Cambridgea Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Lakatos, I. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.~' Criticism and the
Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Cambridge& Cambridge University Press, 1970.

r

l

49

Losee, John. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy
of Science. Oxfords Oxford University Press, 1972.
Mandel, Ernest. The Formation of the Economic Thought of
Karl Marx. New Yorks Monthly Review Press, 1971.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia.
Brace and World, 1936.

New Yorks

Marx, Karl. Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie.
Duncker, 1859,

Harcourt,
Berlins

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. Die deutsche Ideologie
in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engelsa Werke. Vol. III.
Fourth Edition. Berlin& Dietz, 1969.
Masterman, Margaret. "The Nature of a Paradigm." Criticism and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Edited
by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Cambridge& Cambridge
University Press, 1970.
Miliband, Ralph. "Professor Galbraith and.American Capitalism." Economics. Edited by David Mermelstein.
New Yorks Random House, 1970.
Musgrave, Alan. "Kuhn's Second Thoughts." :British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, XXII, No. 3 (1971),

PP• 287-97.
Nieburg, H. L. In the Name of Science.
Chicago a Quadrangle, 1970.

Revised Edition.

Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations.
New Yorks Harper & Row, 1968.

Harper Edition.

"Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften." Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie. Frankfurta
Luchterhand, 1971.
----~

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
inson, 1959.

~~~

The Open Society and Its Enemies. Two Volumes.
Fourth revised Edition. New Yorka Harper & Row,
1963.
The Poverty of Historicism.
Harper & Row, 1961.

--~~Yorks

Londona

Third Edition.

Hutch-

New

Price, Don K. The Scientific Estate. Oxford Paperback.
Oxfords Oxford University Press, 1968.

r

50

Ravetz, Jerome. Scientific Knowledge and Its Social
Problems. Oxfords Clarenden Press, 1971.
Schroyer, Trent. "The Dialectical Foundation of Critical
Theorya Jilrgen Habermas' Metatheoretical Investigations," Telos, No. 12 (Summer, 1972), pp. 93-114.
Settle, T. W. "The Point of Positive Evidence -- Reply to
Professor Feyerabend." British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, XX, No. 4 (1969), pp. 352-54.
Stark, Franz. Revolution Oder Reforms Herbert Marcuse und
Karl Popper -- Eine Konfrontation. Third Edition.
Munich1 Koesel-Verlag, 1972.
Toulmin, s. E. "Does the Distinction between Normal and
Revolutionary Science Hold Water?" Criticism and
the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Edited by I.
Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Cambridges Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Williams, L. Pearce. "Normal Science, Scientific Revolutions and the History of Science," Criticism and the
Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Edited by I. Lakatos
and A. Musgrave. Cambridges Cambridge University
Press, 19l0.

r
APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by A. Thomas Ferguson, Jr. has been
read and approved by members of the Department of Political
Science.
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the
fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and
that the thesis is now given final approval with reference
to content and form.
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date

Advisor's Signature

'
l

